2010년 9월 27일 월요일

venture capital theory

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A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance

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Author Info
Berglof, Erik
Abstract

This article analyzes how an entrepreneur and an external investor allocate revenues and control among themselves in a venture capital relationship, given that they want to liquidate their holdings in the future. Within an incomplete contracting framework we generate contractual arrangements that closely resemble those observed in venture capital markets. In particular, we explain the predominance of preferred stock and convertible instruments. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 247-67
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:247-67

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    1. Ouidad Yousfi, 2009. "Leveraged Buy Out: Dynamic agency model with write-off option," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-13, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.[Downloadable!]
    2. Ambec, S., 2004. "On the governance of start-ups," Working Papers 200406, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
    3. Chemla, Gilles & de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne, 2003. "Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent," CEPR Discussion Papers 4139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    4. Andrea Schertler, 2000. "Venture Capital Contracts: A survey of the recent literature," Kiel Working Papers 1017, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
    5. Pia Weiss, 2002. "A Note on Firms' Strategic Behaviour During an IPO," Microeconomics 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Christian Keuschnigg, 2003. "Optimal Public Policy For Venture Capital Backed Innovation," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 2003-09, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Bronwyn H. Hall & Josh Lerner, 2009. "The Financing of R&D and Innovation," NBER Working Papers 15325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    8. Gary Gorton & Bruce D. Grundy, 1996. "Executive Compensation and the Optimality of Managerial Entrenchment," NBER Working Papers 5779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    9. Hellmann, Thomas F., 2002. "IPOs, Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital," Research Papers 1702r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.[Downloadable!]
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    10. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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    11. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    12. Gebhardt, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2006. "Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.[Downloadable!] (restricted)
    13. Bergemann, D. & Hege, U., 1997. "Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning," Discussion Paper 1997-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.[Downloadable!]
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    14. Yochanan Shachmurove, . "An Empirical Investigation of IPO's Annualized Returns in the Last Three Decades," Penn CARESS Working Papers 823ad5f6b6eb3583cc703364e, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
    15. Dessi, Roberta, 2004. "Start-up Finance, Monitoring and Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 264, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    16. David J. Brophy & Wassim Mourtada, 1999. "Equity finance and the economic transition of rural America : a new framework for private-sector initiatives and positive economic public policy," Proceedings – Rural Conferences, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 107-164. [Downloadable!]
    17. Tereza Tykvová, 2003. "The Role of the Value Added by the Venture Capitalists in Timing and Extent of IPOs," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/25, Center for Financial Studies.[Downloadable!]
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